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Aug 30, 2021, 1:43:43 AMAug 30

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NOT JUST Physics, WHITE FILTH has been SELLING SNAKE OIL in "EVERY

FIELD" for CENTURIES.

Stephen Hawking was PROVED WRONG in 9 out of his 10 theories, but the

ENTIRE WHITE RACE still WORSHIPS him as some kind of GENIUS.

White filth SOLD "String theory" as holy grail for a couple of decades

and then DUMPED IT and MOVED ON.

REALITY "HATES the pathologically LYING, CUNNING DECEPTIVE WHITE FILTH"

to the CORE.

NOT A SINGLE WHITE on this planet LIVES IN REALITY, not a single white.

==========================================================================

https://aurocafe.substack.com/p/the-great-scandal-of-physics?r=92gds&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&utm_source=twitter

The great scandal of physics

Featuring Schrödinger’s cat

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Thank you for signing up for Aurocafe, the newsletter about quantum

quandaries, consciousness conundrums, and the spiritual philosophy of

the Upanishads as explained and developed further by Sri Aurobindo. You

will have noticed that these fields are replete with deep issues,

separately and more so where they overlap. Addressing these issues

involves unfamiliar concepts and leads into unaccustomed territory.

While I am trying my level best to make this as painless as possible,

some of these essays will be easier to read than others, and some will

appeal more to certain readers and less to others. Today’s essay may be

a case in point. (But do not miss the ending!) It is not a sign of

things to come!

In The Ashgate Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Physics,1 David

Wallace introduces the chapter on “Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics” with

the following words:

By some measures, quantum mechanics is the great success story of

modern physics: no other physical theory has come close to the range and

accuracy of its predictions and explanations. By other measures, it is

instead the great scandal of physics: despite these amazing successes,

we have no satisfactory physical theory at all — only an ill-defined

heuristic which makes unacceptable reference to primitives such as

“measurement”, “observer” and even “consciousness”. This is the

measurement problem, and it dominates philosophy of quantum mechanics.

Wallace draws a distinction between (i) a “bare quantum formalism,”

which he describes as “an elegant piece of mathematics” that comes

“prior to any notion of probability, measurement etc.,” and (ii) a

“quantum algorithm,” which he describes as “an ill-defined and

unattractive mess.” And he insists that measurement “is a physical

process, not an unanalyzable primitive.”

It does indeed seem perfectly reasonable to hold that a measurement

involves an interaction between an apparatus and a physical system on

which the measurement is performed. Yet if this interaction is modeled

as a physical process, and if this process is described in

quantum-mechanical terms, what follows is that no measurement ever has

an outcome (which is self-contradictory) or that a measurement involves

something beyond the realm of the physical, something like the

consciousness of an observer (which to most philosophers of science is

worse).

Let’s consider what it means, to most physicists and philosophers of

science, to describe the interaction between a measurement apparatus and

a physical system as a quantum-mechanical process:

|A₀⟩⊗|Ψ⟩ → Σₖ cₖ |Aₖ⟩⊗|qₖ⟩ → |A(q)⟩⊗|q⟩

I will make this as simple as possible (but not simpler). To the left of

the first arrow we have a mathematical operation represented by the

symbol ⊗, which combines |A₀⟩ (a mathematical thingummy said to

represent the apparatus in its neutral state, prior to the measurement

interaction) and |Ψ⟩ (a mathematical thingummy said to represent the

initial state of the quantum system). The first arrow represents the

period of time during which the interaction takes place, and the

expression between the two arrows represents the result of the

interaction. As indicated by the symbol Σₖ, it is a sum of as many terms

as there are possible outcomes. cₖ is a complex number that depends on

|Ψ⟩. |qₖ⟩ is said to represent the system as having the property qₖ

(one of the possible outcomes), and |Aₖ⟩ is said to represent the

apparatus as indicating that the system has the property qₖ.

Because the interaction results in a sum of as many terms as there are

possible outcomes, the measurement is as yet unfinished. The first stage

of the purported measurement process is therefore known as

pre-measurement. The second arrow represents the transition to a state

in which the system has the property q (one of the possible outcomes)

and the apparatus indicates that this is the case. This stage is known

as objectification, and it is what quantum mechanics cannot explain. For

this reason the measurement problem is also known as “the disaster of

objectification”.2

How, then, is the connection made between the “bare quantum formalism,”

according to which measurements lack definite outcomes, and human

experience, in which measurements have definite outcomes? It is made by

stipulating that the squared magnitude |cₖ|² of cₖ is the probability

with which the measurement yields the experienced outcome qₖ.

Wallace is right that probability cannot emerge from a “bare quantum

formalism” which has no bearing on probability. Probability is the kind

of something that you cannot get from nothing. Precisely for this reason

there is no such thing as a bare quantum formalism “prior to any notion

of probability, measurement etc.” Every single axiom of every

axiomatization of the quantum theory is, and only makes sense as, a

feature of a calculus that serves to assign probabilities to measurement

outcomes and on the basis of measurement outcomes.3

If the expression Σₖ cₖ |Aₖ⟩⊗|qₖ⟩ would actually represent the combined

state of system and apparatus, one would have to admit that the

interpretation of the squared magnitude of cₖ as a probability is

inacceptable and may even be considered scandalous. But what is actually

inacceptable is the set of notions which render the interpretation of

|cₖ|² as a probability inacceptable. Foremost among these are the

notions that |Ψ⟩ and |A₀⟩ represent the respective physical states of

system and apparatus prior to the measurement, that |qₖ⟩ represents the

system as having the property qₖ, and that |Aₖ⟩ represents the apparatus

as indicating this outcome. For it is self-contradictory to interpret

the sum Σₖ cₖ |Aₖ⟩⊗|qₖ⟩ as the combined physical state of system and

apparatus and also to interpret the respective terms |qₖ⟩ and |Aₖ⟩ as

representing the system in possession of the property qₖ and the

apparatus as indicating this outcome. This is exactly the befuddled

thinking which leads to the notorious Schrödinger-cat state

|S-cat⟩ = c₁ |A₁⟩⊗|cat(alive)⟩ + c₂ |A₂⟩⊗|cat(dead)⟩,

where |cat(alive)⟩ is supposed to represents the cat as being alive and

|A₁⟩ is supposed to represents the apparatus as signaling this fact —

and ditto for |cat(dead)⟩ and |A₂⟩ — even as the sum of the two terms

then represents the cat as being neither dead nor alive (or both dead

and alive).

Here is the scenario as originally thought up by Schrödinger4:

One can even set up quite ridiculous cases. A cat is penned up in a

steel chamber, along with the following diabolical device (which must be

secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter

there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in

the course of one hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal

probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges

and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of

hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to itself for an

hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has

decayed. The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. The ψ-function

of the entire system would express this by having in it the living and

the dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal

parts. It is typical of these cases that an indeterminacy originally

restricted to the atomic domain becomes transformed into macroscopic

indeterminacy, which can then be resolved by direct observation.

The fact of the matter is that the symbol |x⟩ denotes a vector in a

certain mathematical space. While by itself it bears no relation to

either physical reality or human experience, it is often used (and

should in fact only be used) as a convenient shorthand for another

mathematical animal, which is designated by the symbol |x⟩⟨x|. This

represents a measurement outcome — either that to which a probability is

assigned or that on the basis of which probabilities are assigned.

Probabilities are calculated as outputs of a mathematical machine T,

which has two input slots. The first slot is for the outcome on the

basis of which probabilities are assigned, the second slot is for the

outcome to which a probability is assigned. Thus if |A₁⟩⟨A₁| is inserted

into the first slot, T serves to assign probabilities to the possible

outcomes of another measurement B, based on the information provided by

|A₁⟩⟨A₁|, which is that the cat is alive. If |A₁⟩⟨A₁| is inserted into

the second slot, T serves to assign a probability to finding (by means

of another measurement B) that measurement A indicates that the cat is

alive, conditional on whatever measurement outcome is fed into the first

slot.

Share Aurocafe

From quantum theory’s early days, the goal of making physical sense of

the theory’s mathematical formalism has been pursued along two

apparently divergent lines, one fundamentally philosophical, the other

essentially mathematical; one spearheaded by Niels Bohr, the other set

in motion by the mathematician, physicist, and computer scientist John

von Neumann.

When Bohr wrote5 that “the physical content of quantum mechanics is

exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing

observations obtained under conditions specified in plain language,”

most people took him to advocate a naïve realistic view of measuring

instruments and other macroscopic objects. What he was actually trying

to defend was an essentially Kantian stance. To him, the events which

quantum mechanics correlates statistically were experiences capable of

objectivation,6 which requires communication in terms that everybody can

understand. (His insistence on the use of plain language would make no

sense if he were merely advocating a metaphysically sterile

instrumentalism.)

As regards von Neumann, it is well known that the mathematical formalism

of quantum mechanics was worked out by him in a systematic and

mathematically precise way and summed up in his celebrated 1932 book.7

Many published discussions of interpretive issues in quantum mechanics

present von Neumann as viewing the “quantum state” |Ψ⟩ as a

representation of a physical state that is capable of changing

(“evolving”) in two distinct ways: continuously between measurements (as

also during the so-called pre-measurement stage); and discontinuously at

the objectification stage, when a measurement is completed and the

system’s state is said to “collapse.”

It is much less well known that, soon after the publication of his book,

von Neumann rejected in favor of |Ψ⟩⟨Ψ| the central role he had assigned

to |Ψ⟩. While, mathematically speaking, |Ψ⟩ is a vector in some vector

space V, |Ψ⟩⟨Ψ| is an operator that projects vectors into a subspace of

V. Von Neumann thus abandoned the notion of a physical state with two

distinct modes of change, and instead espoused as the physically

relevant core of quantum mechanics the conditional probabilities defined

by the “trace operator” T with its two input slots for projection

operators.8

While both Bohr and von Neumann (after the publication of his book) thus

were on convergent tracks, too many physicists and philosophers of

science today see the issue of interpreting quantum mechanics as a

choice between a view that Bohr never held (instrumentalism) and a view

that von Neumann soon abandoned (quantum state realism).

There are actually two measurement problems. One, sometimes called the

“big” measurement problem, is the problem of explaining how measurement

outcomes come about “dynamically,” i.e., as a result of a single

continuous mode of change, without invoking a second, discontinuous mode

of change. This problem arises from the false premise that |Ψ⟩

represents a physical state, and that its dependence on time is the

continuous time dependence of a physical state.

While the passage of time between the first measurement (on the basis of

whose outcome probabilities are assigned) and the second measurement (to

the possible outcomes of which probabilities are assigned) is taken care

of by an operator that depends on the respective times of the two

measurements, this operator does not represent a physical process that

brings about a physical change. Any story purporting to relate what

happens between the two measurements is (in Wolfgang Pauli’s felicitous

phrase) “not even wrong,” inasmuch as it can be neither proved nor

disproved.

“Observations,” as Schrödinger wrote, “are to be regarded as discrete,

disconnected events. Between them there are gaps which we cannot fill

in.” The reason we cannot fill in these gaps is that the concepts at our

disposal — in particular: position and momentum, time and energy,

causality and interaction — owe their meanings in large part to the

spatiotemporal structure of human sensory experience, and are therefore

unlikely to be applicable to what is inaccessible to human sensory

experience. While measurement outcomes and the experimental conditions

under which they are obtained are directly accessible to human sensory

experience, what happens between measurements is not, and therefore

cannot be expected to be expressible with the concepts at our disposal.

The second measurement problem, sometimes referred to as the “small”

one, is the question why certain projection operators |x⟩⟨x| (or the

subspaces into which they project) represent possible measurement

outcomes, while others do not.

The reason we never experience a measurement pointer as simultaneously

pointing in two different directions is that measurement outcomes are

experiences, and experiences conform to Kant’s principle of

thoroughgoing determination. Assuming that every thing was accessible to

direct sensory experience, Kant9 concluded that

every thing, as to its possibility, stands under the principle of

thoroughgoing determination, according to which, among all possible

predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites,

one must apply to it.

Because Kant’s principle applies to everything that is accessible to

sensory experience, it applies to every outcome-indicating property, and

therefore it implies the definiteness of every measurement outcome.

As long as the cat is directly accessible to sensory experience, it can

serve as a measurement pointer: if after an hour the cat is alive, it

indicates that as yet no atom has decayed, and if after an hour the cat

is dead, it indicates that at least one atom has decayed. Is it possible

to make the cat inaccessible to direct sensory experience by, say,

penning it up in a steel chamber? Suppose that it is. While we are then

ignorant of the state of the cat (alive or dead), we are by no means

cognizant of the cat’s being neither dead nor alive. To be cognizant of

such a state, we must have evidence that such a state obtains. Is it

possible to have such evidence?

Let’s start with the simplest possible situation. It is perfectly

feasible to prepare a particle in such a way that its spin, if measured

with respect to the vertical axis, is certain to be found up, and that

its spin is equally likely to be found up or down if measured with

respect to a horizontal axis. In this case, finding the spin up with

respect to the vertical axis implies that the spin is neither up nor

down with respect to any horizontal axis. It is also possible (if

technically more challenging) to perform an experiment that has a

possible outcome which implies that neither of the following is the

case: no atom has decayed and at least one atom has decayed. And it

would also be possible to obtain evidence that the cat is neither alive

nor dead if it were possible to perform an experiment that has a

possible outcome which implies that the cat is neither alive nor dead.

Let us furthermore take into account that the properties of quantum

systems are contextual:10 they are defined by the experimental

conditions under which they are observed, and they only exist if their

presence is indicated. Since presently we are treating the cat as a

quantum system, we need to ask: is it possible to conceive of

experimental conditions that define a property whose existence would, if

indicated, imply that the cat is neither alive nor dead?

Let’s take the craziness a step further. If such experimental conditions

could be created, it would be possible to transform a living cat into

one which is neither dead not alive. It would then also be possible to

transform a dead cat into one which is neither dead nor alive. And it

would then be possible to determine, by a subsequent measurement,

whether the cat is dead or alive, and it would be possible to find that

the cat is alive. In other words, it would be possible to resurrect a

dead cat. I am not making this up. Luigi Picasso, for one, writes in his

Lectures in Quantum Mechanics (Springer, 2016, p. 341) that “tomorrow,

when the observables that today do not exist will become available, we

will be able, by means of two measurements, to resurrect dead cats...”

Aug 30, 2021, 9:35:03 AMAug 30

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In article <he_WI.5185$lC6....@fx41.iad>

FBInCIAnNSATerroristSlayer <FBInCIAnNSATe...@yahoo.com> wrote:

Flush.

FBInCIAnNSATerroristSlayer <FBInCIAnNSATe...@yahoo.com> wrote:

Flush.

Aug 30, 2021, 12:33:22 PMAug 30

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Aug 30, 2021, 12:34:50 PMAug 30

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On 8/30/2021 6:33 AM, Mkt wrote:

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